Submitted by Adam (not verified) on Thu, 2008-05-15 14:47.
Despite my praise for this interview and admiration of Donna Haraway's ingenuity in general, I very much agree with Alexandra's criticism of Haraway's asymmetrical relation with her companion animals. I think the conception of companion species is very clever and useful in disrupting imperialistic humanistic identity, but I am also very concerned with Haraway embracing institutional mechanisms of colonizing animal Others' bodies and genomes.
Haraway is not alone in her praise for the rich "history" of human-animal relations. Michael Pollan is also a supporter of "humane" animal agri-culture because it is a celebration and conservation of domestic animals who are, according to him, both beautiful human artifacts as well as coevolutionary partners (Pollan Food, Ethics, and Environment Conference). The major difference between Haraway and Pollan is the formers' technophilism and the latter's techno-sceptisism. Both, though, seem to follow what I'd call an "eco/trans-humanism"--despite Haraway's noteworthy suggestion that we abandon humanist discourses.
Concealing Domination: A Hidden Humanist Agenda?
I think Lauren brings up a really important point, that just as identity politics became instrumental to gaining recognition and privilege, postmodernism came along and proclaimed that identity was BS. In this sense, by abandoning humanist discourse *and* accepting reproductive and psycho-social coercion of animal Others, Haraway veils the humanist ideology behind her privileging such a humanist project. As anti-immigrationists hide their racism behind discourses of economics and civil rights and many libertarians want to dissolve borders to allow for cheaper labor (and exploitation of foreign people), it seems as if Haraway (unintentionally/indifferently) does the same in the case of legitimatizing power over "companion species."
As animals can be instrumentalized and conformed to human will, reconceptions of identity do not become so much liberating as they are oppressive and dominating. As Hariet Ritvo explored in Animal Estate, dog breeding was related to class affirmation and privilege over mixed breeds and foreign nationalities. Boria Sax, in rebuttles to his review of When Species Meet, comments
"..it is very hard to tell whether Haraway is fighting human dominance, concealing it, or expressing it. Take, for example, her work in dog training. When a trainer gives commands and the dog is expected to follow them exactly, this can certainly appear to be the ultimate extreme of dominance. One might reply (as I believe Haraway does) that impression is only predicated on the idea that the dog is something separate from the human being, but if human identity is expanded to include the dog that dominance disappears. But is this just an elaborate rationalization?... Experience suggests that we may be able to expand our definitions of "humanity" indefinitely, yet the drive toward dominance will remain at least as strong... Expanding the human realm is not the same thing as limiting human dominance" (Sax "Haraway's Technophilia" I, "Haraway's Technophilia" II)
Wildness and Domesticity
Ironically, technophilic post-structuralists like Haraway and mythopoetic, quasi-(bio)essentialists like Paul Shepard (see The Others) share something in common. Although Haraway's transhumanism (though, she'll never call it that) and Shepard's deep ecology seem at first radically different in their advocacy--one oriented towards the future, the other towards the past--, they converge in their applications. Both ideologies result in an instrumentalization of animals through relationship where human identity shifts as they come into contact with their Others. Though Shepard shuns domesticity and domestic versions of wild animals, he does so out of a pity for their supposed diminished being. Haraway seems to suggest the inverse: she welcomes wild species to fuse into human civilization/identity through imposing human deliberation upon their being to perhaps make them better or more privileged than those in the wild by bringing them closer. (Sax Review of When Species Meet)
"Killing Well": Who's at the end of the waiting line?
Haraway also insinuates, like Shepard, that animals can be killed well ("killing well"). Instead of categorizing a being as "killeable," one recognizes the subjectivity and desires of the animal Other. This may sound all fine and good, but it seems more insidious to me. Killing another "subject" well may be more honest, however, to frame the killing of another who enjoys living and acting in his/her world as something that can be made acceptable if done "well" opens up more doors than most would feel comfortable opening up. For instance, if "we have never been human" and non-human animals can be killed well, then why not kill H. sapiens well. Perhaps eliminating certain genes and cultures and breeding improved and better ones, the eugenics project, is a noble goal. How can one ever justify killing one well and the impossibility of killing another well. Although, I do not universally condemn the killing of animal Others, I feel that there is a tremendous difference between re-institutionalizing human domination over animals in the idea of a transformative identity and meely choosing to live the least harmful lifestyle within the context of one's local ecology.
Relationality and Outsideness
Last year I was a major supporter of relational ethics, and i still am, but I am increasingly becoming skeptical of them. Communitarianism creates fairly rigid (and potentially violent) boundaries and rites, and relational-ethics like Confucianism often carry with them dominating assymetries. I'm even skeptical of Midgley's idea of a 'mixed community' now. Even though she writes that a mixed community is not composed of concentric circles as J Baird Callicott imagines in is Leopoldian extentionist framework, Midgley almost always privileges human interests over animal other interests. [Although, to be fair, she is a great proponent of animal personhood and welfare].
I think liberals have a point, now, in stressing the value of independence/outsideness. The more distanced one is, the more critical one can become of oppressive systems. By immersing human identity and epistemology so intimately into relations with other species (and techologies), one increases the risk of unquestionably accepting such asymmetrical relations. yes, we may be intrinsically relational beings, but as agents we can *choose* who we affiliate with and *how*. Personally, I don't think respectful/caring intentions are sufficient for ethical/acceptable behavior, one must also consider the processes and consequences. Josephine Donovan's diaological care ethic, I believe, is a better mode of engagig and flourishing *with* animal others.
Despite my praise for this interview and admiration of Donna Haraway's ingenuity in general, I very much agree with Alexandra's criticism of Haraway's asymmetrical relation with her companion animals. I think the conception of companion species is very clever and useful in disrupting imperialistic humanistic identity, but I am also very concerned with Haraway embracing institutional mechanisms of colonizing animal Others' bodies and genomes.
Haraway is not alone in her praise for the rich "history" of human-animal relations. Michael Pollan is also a supporter of "humane" animal agri-culture because it is a celebration and conservation of domestic animals who are, according to him, both beautiful human artifacts as well as coevolutionary partners (Pollan Food, Ethics, and Environment Conference). The major difference between Haraway and Pollan is the formers' technophilism and the latter's techno-sceptisism. Both, though, seem to follow what I'd call an "eco/trans-humanism"--despite Haraway's noteworthy suggestion that we abandon humanist discourses.
Concealing Domination: A Hidden Humanist Agenda?
I think Lauren brings up a really important point, that just as identity politics became instrumental to gaining recognition and privilege, postmodernism came along and proclaimed that identity was BS. In this sense, by abandoning humanist discourse *and* accepting reproductive and psycho-social coercion of animal Others, Haraway veils the humanist ideology behind her privileging such a humanist project. As anti-immigrationists hide their racism behind discourses of economics and civil rights and many libertarians want to dissolve borders to allow for cheaper labor (and exploitation of foreign people), it seems as if Haraway (unintentionally/indifferently) does the same in the case of legitimatizing power over "companion species."
As animals can be instrumentalized and conformed to human will, reconceptions of identity do not become so much liberating as they are oppressive and dominating. As Hariet Ritvo explored in Animal Estate, dog breeding was related to class affirmation and privilege over mixed breeds and foreign nationalities. Boria Sax, in rebuttles to his review of When Species Meet, comments
"..it is very hard to tell whether Haraway is fighting human dominance, concealing it, or expressing it. Take, for example, her work in dog training. When a trainer gives commands and the dog is expected to follow them exactly, this can certainly appear to be the ultimate extreme of dominance. One might reply (as I believe Haraway does) that impression is only predicated on the idea that the dog is something separate from the human being, but if human identity is expanded to include the dog that dominance disappears. But is this just an elaborate rationalization?... Experience suggests that we may be able to expand our definitions of "humanity" indefinitely, yet the drive toward dominance will remain at least as strong... Expanding the human realm is not the same thing as limiting human dominance" (Sax "Haraway's Technophilia" I, "Haraway's Technophilia" II)
Wildness and Domesticity
Ironically, technophilic post-structuralists like Haraway and mythopoetic, quasi-(bio)essentialists like Paul Shepard (see The Others) share something in common. Although Haraway's transhumanism (though, she'll never call it that) and Shepard's deep ecology seem at first radically different in their advocacy--one oriented towards the future, the other towards the past--, they converge in their applications. Both ideologies result in an instrumentalization of animals through relationship where human identity shifts as they come into contact with their Others. Though Shepard shuns domesticity and domestic versions of wild animals, he does so out of a pity for their supposed diminished being. Haraway seems to suggest the inverse: she welcomes wild species to fuse into human civilization/identity through imposing human deliberation upon their being to perhaps make them better or more privileged than those in the wild by bringing them closer. (Sax Review of When Species Meet)
"Killing Well": Who's at the end of the waiting line?
Haraway also insinuates, like Shepard, that animals can be killed well ("killing well"). Instead of categorizing a being as "killeable," one recognizes the subjectivity and desires of the animal Other. This may sound all fine and good, but it seems more insidious to me. Killing another "subject" well may be more honest, however, to frame the killing of another who enjoys living and acting in his/her world as something that can be made acceptable if done "well" opens up more doors than most would feel comfortable opening up. For instance, if "we have never been human" and non-human animals can be killed well, then why not kill H. sapiens well. Perhaps eliminating certain genes and cultures and breeding improved and better ones, the eugenics project, is a noble goal. How can one ever justify killing one well and the impossibility of killing another well. Although, I do not universally condemn the killing of animal Others, I feel that there is a tremendous difference between re-institutionalizing human domination over animals in the idea of a transformative identity and meely choosing to live the least harmful lifestyle within the context of one's local ecology.
Relationality and Outsideness
Last year I was a major supporter of relational ethics, and i still am, but I am increasingly becoming skeptical of them. Communitarianism creates fairly rigid (and potentially violent) boundaries and rites, and relational-ethics like Confucianism often carry with them dominating assymetries. I'm even skeptical of Midgley's idea of a 'mixed community' now. Even though she writes that a mixed community is not composed of concentric circles as J Baird Callicott imagines in is Leopoldian extentionist framework, Midgley almost always privileges human interests over animal other interests. [Although, to be fair, she is a great proponent of animal personhood and welfare].
I think liberals have a point, now, in stressing the value of independence/outsideness. The more distanced one is, the more critical one can become of oppressive systems. By immersing human identity and epistemology so intimately into relations with other species (and techologies), one increases the risk of unquestionably accepting such asymmetrical relations. yes, we may be intrinsically relational beings, but as agents we can *choose* who we affiliate with and *how*. Personally, I don't think respectful/caring intentions are sufficient for ethical/acceptable behavior, one must also consider the processes and consequences. Josephine Donovan's diaological care ethic, I believe, is a better mode of engagig and flourishing *with* animal others.